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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
PUBLIC LAW
THORNTON V. CALDOR: WILL THE SUPREME
COURT PUT THE SQUEEZE ON LEMON?
In 1983, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that a state "Sabbath statute"
violated the establishment clause of the United States Constitution.' The statute
provided that an employee's refusal to work on a day he designates as his Sabbath
is not an appropriate ground for his dismissal.2 The employee, Donald Thornton,
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted in March of 1984.'
This recent development comment discusses the Connecticut Supreme Court's
holding and rationale. It also predicts how the United States Supreme Court will
decide the case based on the language and holdings of previous religion clause
cases. Finally, it explores the possible ramifications of the predicted Supreme
Court holding.
THORNTON V. CALDOR
Facts
Caldor, Inc. required Donald Thornton, a department manager, to work one
out of every four Sundays.4 After complying for two years, Thornton refused to
continue working on Sundays, the day of his Sabbath.' Caldor executives met
with Thornton and offered him two choices: (1) to continue as a supervisor at a
Massachusetts store that did not require Sunday employment; or (2) to remain at
his current store as a nonsupervisor and join the employee union whose contract
provided for Sabbath days off.6 Thornton rejected both r roposals7 and resigned
after the parties failed to reach a satisfactory agreement.
Thornton protested Caldor's actions to the Connecticut state board of media-
tion and arbitration, alleging that Caldor violated state law by not allowing him to
observe his Sabbath.9 The state law, Connecticut General Statute § 53-303(e),
provided:
(a) No employer shall compel any employee engaged in any commercial
1. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), cert. granted sub nom. Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1438 (1984) (No. 83-1158, 1983 Term)
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303(e) (West Supp. 1984).
3. The Court granted the requested writ of certiorari on March 5, 1984. See - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1438
(1984).
4. 191 Conn. at 338, 464 A.2d at 788. Caldor began opening for business on Sundays in 1977. All
department managers were required to work one out of every four Sundays. Id.
5. Thornton worked thirty-one Sundays between 1977 and 1979, but in November of 1979 he informed
Caldor that he would no longer work on Sunday because it was his Sabbath day. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Thornton claimed that the change to Massachusetts would involve undue hardship by forcing him
either to commute or change his residence. Moreover, becoming a union member included a decrease
in pay from $6.46 to $3.50 per hour. Id.
8. Id. Thornton's last day of work was March 8, 1980.
9. Id.
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occupation or in the work of any industrial process to work more than six days
in any calendar week. An employee's refusal to work more than six days in
any calendar week shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(b) No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as
his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An em-
ployee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal.
(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of sub-
section (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state board
of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee was dis-
charged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever rem-
edy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to reinstatement
to his former or a comparable position.
(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire whether
the applicant observes any Sabbath.
(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not
more than two hundred dollars.
Caldor answered that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of
the statute and that the statute was unconstitutional.' Construing its authority
as "quasi-judicial,"" the board assumed the constitutionality of the statute until a
court ruled otherwise." The board held that under the statute Thornton had been
illegally discharged, and it issued an award in his favor. 1
3
Caldor filed an application with a state trial court seeking to vacate the board's
award,' 4 but the trial court affirmed the board's ruling. Caldor then appealed to
the Connecticut Supreme Court. He asserted that the award was illegal'" and
beyond the power of the arbitrators because the statute violated the establishment
clause of the United States Constitution.'6 Although the Connecticut Supreme
Court found that the board had acted within its power in determining that Caldor
had violated the statute, 17 the court ruled that the statute violated the strictures of
the establishment clause.'"
10. 191 Conn. at 339, 464 A.2d at 789.
11. Id. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788.
12. Id. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788.
13. Id. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788.
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-418 (1978):
(a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial
district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial
district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall
make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has
been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or
corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made. (b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the award is required to
be rendered has not expired, the court or judge may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
15. 191 Conn. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788.
16. Id. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788.
17. Id. at 340, 464 A.2d at 789.
18. Id. at 340, 464 A.2d at 789. The establishment clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST., amend. 1. The establishment clause is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
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The Reasoning of the Connecticut Supreme Court
The Connecticut Supreme Court based its decision upon the three -pronged
test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.' Under
that test, a statute violates the establishment clause unless it has a secular legisla-
tive purpose; its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion; and it does not foster an excessive entanglement of government with
religion.20 If a statute fails any prong of the Lemon test, it violates the establish-
ment clause.2 Applying the Lemon test, the Connecticut Supreme Court found
that the statute failed all three prongs and, therefore, violated the establishment
clause.2 2
The court reasoned that the statute did not have a secular legislative pur-
pose.23 It rejected Thornton's assertion that subsection (b) 24 of the statute merely
allowed employees to designate their day of rest, thus reflecting the secular pur-
pose of protecting persons from the "physical and moral debasement which comes
from uninterrupted labor.",25 Subsection (a)26 prohibited employment for more
than six days in a calendar week, thus addressing the secular purpose that Caldor
claimed subsection (b) provided.27 The court reasoned that subsection (b) must
have been meant for a different purpose; namely, to authorize each employee to
designate his or her choice of day to observe a Sabbath. The court concluded that
such a provision had the unmistakable purpose of promoting the freedom to prac-
tice religion.28
Applying the second prong of the Lemon analysis, the court found that the
statute had the primary effect of advancing religion.29 Although the statute did,, j r'30
not provide direct aid to religion in the form of money or property, only em-
ployees who observe a Sabbath day could avail themselves of the benefit of choos-
ing their day of rest from work. Thus, the "benefit" provided by subsection (b)
was based solely on religion. The statute, therefore, violated the second prong of
the Lemon test.3
Finally, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the statute violated the
third prong of the Lemon test.32 Subsection (c) of the statute empowered the state
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20. In Lemon, the Court stated:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria devel-
oped by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster an "excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 688 (1970).
403 U.S. at 612.
21. "If a statute violates any of these three principles [of Lemon], it must be struck down under the
Establishment Clause." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
22. "We conclude that General Statute § 53-303(b) is clearly violative of the establishment clause, and the
trial court therefore erred when it confirmed the arbitration award based on the statute and when it
denied the motion to vacate the award." 191 Conn. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794.
23. Id. 191 Conn. at 349, 464 A.2d at 793.
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303(e) (West Supp. 1984).
25. 464 A.2d at 792 (quoting from McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 436 (1961)).
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303(e) (West Supp. 1984).
27. 191 Conn. at 349, 464 A.2d at 792.
28. The word "Sabbath" itself was capitalized, thereby expressly connoting religious practices. Id. More-
over, the court considered various interpretations of the word "Sabbath" and concluded that it did not
merely mean "day of rest" as asserted by Thornton; rather, it specifically represented the tenets of a
particular religion. Id. at 347, 464 A.2d at 793.
29. Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
30. Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
31. Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
32. Id. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794.
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board of mediators to rule on the "sincerity" of an employee's Sabbath obser-
vance.33 The court held that because such an inquiry would necessarily involve
an analysis of religious practices and activities, the government had created an
unconstitutional entanglement with religion.34
Although the court held that the statute violated the establishment clause, it
implied that the state of Connecticut could enact a law allowing employees to
designate their day off.35 The state could not, however, use religious means to
achieve the secular end of allowing each employee one day off from work per
week.3 6 In fact, subsequent to the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision, the
Connecticut Legislature enacted a statute requiring employers only to make rea-
sonable accommodations to their Sabbath observing employees when they choose
their day off, rather than granting such employees an absolute right to designate
their day off.
37
Appeal to the Supreme Court
Having lost in the Connecticut Supreme Court, Thornton petitioned the
United States Supreme Court, and the Court granted his petition for certiorari.3"
In his brief supporting the petition, Thornton argues that the Connecticut statute
is constitutional for three reasons. 39 First, the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment do not prevent a state from protecting its citizens' exercise of religion against
private discrimination.' Second, a rationality standard, rather than the three
part test of Lemon, should be used in determining the constitutionality of the
Connecticut statute.4 1 Third, the Connecticut statute satisfied constitutional stan-
dards under the Lemon test.42
In response, Caldor argues that the statute violates the establishment clause
because it absolutely requires private employers to defer to the Sabbath practices
of their employees, without regard for the hardship that such a requirement im-
poses on the employer and other employees.4 3 Caldor also contends that the
Court need not reach the establishment clause issue.'
If the Court affirms the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision on nonconstitu-
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303(e) (West Supp. 1984).
34. The court stated: "This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious organization is fraught
with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids." 191 Conn. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794.
(quoting from Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620).
35. Id. at 349, n.10; 464 A.2d at 793, n.10.
36. Id. at 349, n.10; 464 A.2d at 793, n.10.
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(a)-51(18) (1984) provides:
'Discrimination on the basis of religious creed' includes but is not limited to discrimination
related to all aspects of religious observances and practice as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.
38. The Court granted the requested writ of certiorari of March 5, 1984. See - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1438
(1984).
39. See Brief for Petitioner at ii, Thornton v. Caldor, No.83-1158 (1984).
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id at 27.
43. Brief for Respondent at 11, Thornton v. Caldor, No.83-1158 (1984).
44. Id. at 43-50. Caldor argues that the Court need not reach the establishment clause issue because a
constitutional issue should be avoided if a case can be fairly decided on a statutory ground. See
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936). Instead, Caldor contends,
the Court should base its decision on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which provides that "[i]t is
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual because of
such individual's ... religion."
Because the statute allegedly discriminates between religious and non-religious employees, it vio-
lates Title VII. Moreover, the statute does not meet the Title VII exception of "religious accommoda-
1985]
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tional grounds, states will be free to pass similar Sabbath laws subject only to the
restraints of their own state court decisions.4" The United States Supreme Court,
however, will probably reach the establishment clause issue. Because last term's
religion clause decisions have caused considerable confusion,46 the relatively large
number of religion clause cases docketed for this term4 7 reveals the Court's desire
to clarify its position on religious issues.
Thornton's first argument in favor of the Connecticut statute is that the "First
Amendment was never intended to prohibit federal, state, or local government
agencies from safeguarding the rights of people to worship--or refrain from la-
bor-on the day of the week they deem sacred." 48 Thornton also argues that the
establishment and free exercise clauses must be read together to complement one
another.4 9 Thornton urges the Court to follow the lead of Sherbert v. Verner5"
and allow the government to protect religious practices such as Sabbath
observance. 5
SHERBERT V. VERNER
In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged because she refused to
work on Saturdays, the Sabbath day of her faith.5 2 Her claim for unemployment
benefits was subsequently denied because she refused suitable work without good
cause.53 The United States Supreme Court held that the denial of an employee's
tion" because the proscribed unequal treatment of employees amounts to discrimination, not
accommodation. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
Caldor also argues that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted. After
the Court granted the writ, Connecticut adopted a new statute that established a "flexible requirement
that employers make reasonable accommodations to their employees" when they designate a Sabbath
day. Because the statute substituted a reasonableness standard for the absolutist standard, the new
statute avoids the absolute favoritism of traditional religions. Caldor argues that because the statute is
no longer in effect, there remains "no substantial federal interest warranting review by the Court," and
Thornton, the only litigant to reach the Connecticut courts under the Sabbath law, is now deceased.
45. Such a decision would leave open the questions of whether the statute violated the establishment
clause and whether the Lemon test would be applied to future establishment clause issues.
46. In Marsh v. Chambers, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983), the taxpayer, a state legislator, brought an
action challenging the constitutionality of the Nebraska Legislature's policy of opening each legislative
session with a prayer. The chaplain was paid with public funds, and the same chaplain, representing
one religious denomination, opened each session for sixteen years. In finding no violation of the estab-
lishment clause, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion focused on "two centuries of national prac-
tice" in opening state and federal legislative sessions with a prayer. Thus, the "unbroken practice for
two centuries in the National Congress, for more than a century in Nebraska and in many other states,
gives abundant assurance that there is no real threat (of establishing religion) 'while this Court sits.' "
In Lynch v. Donnelly, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984), the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island had
annually erected a Christmas display in the center of town, on land owned by a nonprofit organization.
The city-owned display included such traditional effects as a Santa Claus, a "Seasons Greetings" sign,
and a creche. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger found that the city did not violate the
establishment clause in displaying its creche. The Court concluded that the religion clauses of the first
amendment were not meant to require absolute separation of the government and church; rather, they
were meant to provide for accommodation. Examples of accommodation, cited by the Court, in-
cluded the national celebration of Thanksgiving, which has a religious basis, and Christmas. The
Federal Government pays its employees for such holidays, thus demonstrating a public tolerance for
government "subsidized" holidays with religious significance.
47. Other religion cases docketed by the Court this term include Wallace v. Jaffree, 705 F.2d 1526, cert.
granted, Nos. 83-812 and 83-929 (school prayer); Board of Trustees of the Village of Scarsdale v.
McCreary, 575 F. Supp. 1112, No. 84-277 (display of creche in public park); Grand Rapids v. Ball,
546 F. Supp 1071, No. 83-990 (government aid to parochial schools); and Jensen v. Quaring, 728 F. 2d
1121, No. 83-1944 (free exercise right not to have one's picture on a driver's license).
48. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Thornton v. Caldor, No.83-1158 (1984).
49. Id. at 12.
50. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
51. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Thornton v. Caldor, No.83-1158 (1984).
52. 374 U.S. at 399.
53. Id. at 401.
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unemployment benefits, solely because her faith would not allow her to work
Saturdays, imposed an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her reli-
gion. 4 The Court stated that the decision did not "foster the 'establishment' of
the Seventh-Day Adventist religion contrary to the first amendment. '55 Rather,
the Government merely met its "obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences."
56
Thornton contends that the Sherbert Court recognized the importance of sav-
ing the worshipper from having to make a choice which would infringe upon the
Sabbatarian's right of free exercise.57 Applying the Sherbert principles, Thornton
contends that the Connecticut statute merely afforded him the right to freely exer-
cise his faith by designating a work-free Sabbath.5 8
III. STATUS OF THE LEMON TEST
The analogy to Sherbert sets up Thornton's central argument-that the Court
should not apply the Lemon test to the facts of this case. Thornton relies on
Sherbert and recent establishment clause cases in which the Court has not fol-
lowed Lemon5 9 in attempting to persuade the Supreme Court to adopt his pro-
posed rationality test.'
Whether the Court will carve out a third establishment clause test, however,
and label it "rationality" is highly speculative. The Court has shown a willingness
to carve out exceptions to the Lemon analysis,6 but that does not mean that the
exceptions will be brought together and labeled as a new "test." The Court has
noted the tension between the free exercise of religion and the establishment of
religion.6 2 The Connecticut statute should be another example of the Court's will-
ingness to accommodate the competing interests of the religion clauses. The
Court has made such accommodations when the questioned law concerned histor-
ically or traditionally rooted activities such as nativity displays at Christmas6 3 and
prayers at the opening of legislative sessions." Having a day off for worship
would seem to be a traditional activity. Moreover, the Court has noted that Sun-
day closing laws undeniably allow citizens to attend religious services, but such an
endorsement of religion was upheld nonetheless.65
54. The Court found a clear burden on the appellant's free exercise of religion. The Court held that her
declared ineligibility for benefits derived solely from the practice of her religion, and pressure was
unmistakably put on her to forego that practice. Id. at 403.
55. The court stated: "[T]he extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday
worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of reli-
gious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which
it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall." Id. at 409.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 404.
58. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-19, Thornton v. Caldor, No.83-1158 (1984).
59. In Marsh, - U.S. - 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court virtually ignored the Lemon test, upon which
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had based its opinion in finding that prayers opening legislative
sessions were in violation of the establishment clause. In Lynch, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362
(1984), the majority opinion notes that "[i]n two cases, the Court did not even apply the Lemon 'test.'
We did not, for example, consider that analysis relevant in Marsh, supra. Nor did we find Lemon
useful in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) .... "
60. See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Thornton v. Caldor, No.83-1158.
61. See supra, note 59.
62. "[Tlhe range of permissible state accommodation to free exercise rights runs beyond that constitution-
ally compelled - out to limits ultimately imposed by the Establishment Clause." Forest Hills Early
Learning Center, Inc. v Luckhard, 728 F.2d 230, 241 (1984) (citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S.
664, 673 (1969)).
63. See Lynch, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984).
64. See Marsh, - U.S. -,103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983).
65. See Lynch, - U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1363, n.1l (1984).
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Thus, the Court can be expected to uphold the Connecticut statute as a proper
accommodation of traditional and historical religious practice and limit Lemon to
school funding cases.66 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly said that it will not
limit itself to one test in establishment clause cases.
THE REVISED CONNECTICUT STATUTE AS A MODEL
Even if the Supreme Court agrees with the Connecticut Supreme Court that
the statute violates the establishment clause, and finds Lemon controlling, other
states might use the new Connecticut statute as a model when enacting religious
accommodation provisions for employers and employees.68 The new statute elim-
inated the absolute requirement that employers accommodate religious employ-
ees. Instead, "reasonableness" in accommodation is the standard. The employer
may balance the effect on his business of having too many employees choosing to
take the same day of the week off for worship with the need for religious accom-
modation. Though the burden is on the employer to show undue hardship, the
amended statute should be able to pass a Lemon three-prong analysis.
First, such a statute clearly states a secular purpose of preventing religious
discrimination. 69  Second, although employees may still choose their day off for
religious reasons or purposes, the employer may preempt the employee's choice by
establishing that the exercise of this right places an undue burden on his busi-
ness. 70 Thus, the "effect" is one of accommodation, not of religious promotion.
66. The Lemon case involved state aid to nonpublic schools. Five justices of the Court have indicated
displeasure with the far-reaching application of the Lemon test to establishment clause issues. In
Lynch, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she outlined a "clarified version" of the
application of various establishment clause tests, including Lemon: "It has never been entirely clear,
however, how the three parts of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establish-
ment Clause. Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion
clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device." Id. at 366-67.
Justice White's displeasure with the Lemon test was made clear in his dissenting opinion in Com-
mittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1972): "I am quite unreconciled to the Court's
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). I thought then, and I think now, that the
Court's conclusion there was not required by the First Amendment and is contrary to the long-range
interests of the country." Id. at 820.
Justice Rehnquist has said that the third prong of the Lemon test regarding "divisive political
potential" must be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial
schools or to teachers in parochial schools.
Mueller v. Allen, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3071, n.ll (1983).
In Lynch, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984), Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion contended
that Lemon is not the sole test for establishment clause issues: "[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our
unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area."
Though not specifically addressing Lemon, Justice Powell had shown displeasure regarding past
Court decisions regarding school prayer:
Unless and until the Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions [cites omitted], they appear to
control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated to follow them. Similarly, my
own authority as Circuit Justice is limited by controlling decisions of the full court. Accord-
ingly, I am compelled to grant the requested stay.
Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 842 (1983).
67. See supra note 59.
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(a)-51(18) (1984) provides:
"Discrimination on the basis of religious creed" includes but is not limited to discrimination
related to all aspects of religious observances and practice as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.
69. Thus, there is no longer "an absolutist requirement that Sabbath observance automatically trumps all
secular factors. Brief for Petitioner supra note 39, at 22. Instead, religion is a factor and not a
"veto."
70. Because the absolute yield to Sabbath observance has been removed, the primary effect of the new
statute is that employers must accommodate the religious practices of its employees. Advancing reli-
gion is no longer the primary effect. See id. at 23.
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Third, by focusing on the employer's showing of "undue hardship," the statute
avoids an excessive entanglement of government and religion.7 '
Even if the Supreme Court does not uphold the Connecticut statute, Connecti-
cut has provided an alternative and has left interested states with an approach to
Sabbath statutes that would meet a Lemon analysis. Currently, many states have
statutory provisions that prohibit discrimination based on religion. Most of these
provisions either explicitly provide for,72 or have been interpreted by courts to
require, 73 reasonable accommodation by the employer short of undue hardship to
his business. The use of "reasonable accommodation" in a statute avoids the ab-
solute language 4 of the contested Connecticut statute and should, therefore, pass
constitutional muster if the Supreme Court affirms the ruling of the Connecticut
Supreme Court.
Michael D. Woerner*
71. The focus has been shifted from the employee's sincerity of his Sabbath observance to the employer's
showing of an undue hardship placed on his business by yielding to his Sabbath observing employees.
See id. at 36-38, 40.
72. See, eg., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(6) (1984):
[U]nlawful practices as prohibited by this article [Discrimination in Employment] shall include
practices with respect to religion unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reason-
ably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
The following states have adopted statutory or administrative guidelines regarding religious accommo-
dation: COLORADO [State Laws] FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 453: 1141 (Sept. 25, 1980); District of
Columbia [State Laws] FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 453:1708 (June 11, 1976), (§ 7-E adopts EEOC
guidelines on Title VII which requires reasonable accommodation short of undue hardship, see, 29
C.F.R. § 1605.1); ILLINOIS [State Laws] FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 453:2756 (Dec. 12, 1973) §§ 5.2,
5.3; KANSAS [State Laws] FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 453:3312 (May 1, 1978); MARYLAND ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 15(0; MASSACHUSETrS ANN. LAWS, ch. 151B, § 4.1A (Law.Co-op.1976); MON-
TANA [State Laws] FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 455:1901 (July 14, 1983) (which adopts 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.1); NEVADA [State Laws] FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 455:2351 (April 6, 1961) (which adopts
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1); OKLAHOMA [State Laws] FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 457:555-6 (Feb. 25, 1977);
SOUTH CAROLINA CODE ANN. § 1-13-30(K); SOUTH DAKOTA [State Laws] FAIR. EMPL. PRAC.
(BNA), 457:1754 (Dec. 16, 1979); TENNESSEE [State Laws] FAIR. EMPL. PRAC. (BNA), 457:1887
(Jan. 19, 1979) (which adopts 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1); TEXAS ANN. CIV. ST. art.5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(B),
5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VIRGINIA CODE, §§ 40.1-28.1 to 28.3 (1981); WISCONSIN STAT. ANN.
§ 111.337(1) (West Supp. 1983).
73. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200, 18.80.220(a)(1)(1965) as interpreted by Wondzell v. Alaska
Wood Products, Inc., 583 P.2d 860 (Alaska 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 601 P.2d 584 (1979);
CALIFORNIA CONST. art I § 8 as interpreted in Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence,
154 Cal. Rprt. 907, 593 P.2d 852 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(l)(a) (West 1975) as interpreted
in King v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 334 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1983); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN.
tit.5, § 4572 (1)(A) (1979) as interpreted in Maine Human Rights Commission v. Local 1361, United
Paperworkers Int. Union AFL-CIO, 383 A.2d 369 (Me. 1978); NEW YORK EXEC. LAW § 296.10
(McKinney 1982) as interpreted in State Division of Human Rights ex rel. Clarke v. Carnation Co., 86
A. D. 2d 977, 448 N.Y.S. 2d 330 (1982).
74. Some state statutes have absolute provisions similar to the contested Connecticut statute. See, eg.,
MISSOURI ANN. STAT., § 578.115 (Vernon 1979); KENTUCKY REV. STAT. § 436.165(4)(a) (1975).
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